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Fights-to-the-death occur in many natural, medical and commercial settings. Standard mass
action theory and conventional wisdom imply that the minority (i.e. smaller) group’s survival time
decreases as its relative initial size decreases, in the absence of replenishment. Here we show that the
opposite actually happens, if the minority group features internal network dynamics. Our analytic
theory provides a unified quantitative explanation for a range of previously unexplained data, and
predicts how losing battles in a medical or social context might be extended or shortened using
third-party intervention.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Jk, 64.60.Fr, 89.75.Hc
Wars of attrition are widespread, e.g. fights among
ants[1], chimpanzees[2, 3] or birds[4], a War of the Worms
on the Internet[5], commercial wars between companies
or products[6], human warfare[7, 8, 9, 10], immunolog-
ical battles against disease[11, 12, 13], irreversible bio-
chemical reactions[14], and even electron-hole recombi-
nation in semiconductors[15]. Much fascinating work ex-
ists on predator-prey problems[16], however little has ap-
peared concerning the duration T of a predator-predator
‘fight-to-the-death’. The duration T would traditionally
be calculated invoking a mass-action law for the irre-
versible reaction A + B → Z, where Z is neither A nor
B. Standard mass action theories[8, 17] and conventional
military thinking[7] both suggest that the minority (i.e.
smaller) group’s survival time T decreases as its relative
initial size decreases.
In this paper, we calculate analytically the duration
T of a war of attrition, uncovering the surprising result
that the adoption of internal network dynamics greatly
prolongs the minority group’s survival time. By con-
trast, T is remarkably insensitive to the internal dynam-
ics adopted by the majority population. Our analytic
theory provides a unified, quantitative explanation for a
range of previously unexplained data. It also predicts
how the duration of a losing battle can be manipulated
using modest third-party intervention and without the
need to directly fight either predator. In addition to its
potential applications, our work provides a novel demon-
stration of the breakdown of standard mass-action differ-
ential equations when describing a system with dynami-
cal internal heterogeneity.
The mass-action equations which are routinely ap-
plied to conflicts take one of two forms[1, 2, 3, 6,
8, 9, 10, 13]: (1) dNA(t)/dt = −aNA(t)NB(t) and
dNB(t)/dt = −bNA(t)NB(t), which is called Lanchester’s
undirected fire model; or (2) dNA(t)/dt = −a′NB(t) and
dNB(t)/dt = −b′NA(t), which is called Lanchester’s di-
rected fire model[1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13]. Here NA(t)
and NB(t) are the population sizes at time t and a, b,
a′, b′ are constants. For simplicity, we focus on simple
attrition where no appreciable replenishment of A or B
arises over the timescale of the entire process, and we
adopt the familiar language of human conflict – however
these simplifications can be generalized according to ap-
plication area[13]. Indeed, generalized versions of these
mass-action models lie at the heart of modern mathe-
matical biology[9, 17]. The blue curves in Fig. 1 show
these two mass-action models’ predictions for the time T
taken to eliminate the smaller population, as a function
of the asymmetry x between peak (i.e. initial) population
size: x = |NA(0)−NB(0)|/[NA(0)+NB(0)], hence x ∼ 0
when the peak (i.e. initial) population sizes are similar
and x ∼ 1 when very different. The total number is fixed
at N = NA(0) + NB(0). Since N  1, we can take the
end-point for the undirected fire model to correspond to
reducing the smaller population to one instead of zero,
thereby avoiding problems with a continuum description
of NA(t) and NB(t) near zero. We set a = b and a′ = b′
to avoid any implicit bias.
In the case that B (or A) features internal network
dynamics, our model represents a generalization of Ref.
[21]. The resulting population, which evolves continually
in time, features (i) temporary communities (i.e. clus-
ters) which may form, grow and breakup over time, (ii)
a fluctuating number of such communities and commu-
nity membership, (iii) no permanent central leadership
and no permanent hierarchical structure, and (iv) long-
ranged interactions. While explicit spatial generaliza-
tions are possible, this model already mimics the fluid,
non-spatial community structure expected of traders in
a global financial market[21, 22], or insurgent cells in
a modern guerilla war in which communication can take
place over any distance[19, 20, 23]. At time t, populations
A and B have nAs (t) and n
B
s (t) clusters of size s, such
that
∑
snAs (t) = NA(t) and
∑
snBs (t) = NB(t). A clus-
ter is picked randomly with a probability proportional
to its size, mimicking the notion that at any moment
in time any randomly chosen individual can initiate an
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2FIG. 1: (Color online) Vertical axis shows duration T (or
equivalently, the extinction time or survival time of the mi-
nority group) as a function of the asymmetry x between the
two opposing forces. Blue circles are ‘old’ wars, red trian-
gles are ‘new’ wars[19, 20]. Data are up to the end of 2008,
hence the final datapoints for the three ongoing wars will lie
above the positions shown, as indicated by arrows. Lower two
blue lines are the mass-action (i.e. Lanchester) model results.
Upper red line is our theoretical curve (i.e. Eq. (3)) with
νA = νB = 0.7. Changing νA and νB changes the height of
the theoretical peak, but leaves the qualitative features un-
changed.
event. Figure 2(c) summarizes the corresponding events.
This cluster fragments with a probability dependent on
its identity, i.e. νA or νB , mimicking the idea of clusters
disbanding if they sense danger. If the cluster does not
fragment, a second cluster is selected from the total pop-
ulation. If the two clusters are both A or both B, they
coalesce. This ‘coalescence’ can simply mean that the two
groups act in a coordinated way, not necessarily that they
are physically joined. If they are of different types, they
interact (i.e. fight). During this interaction, the smaller
cluster is destroyed and the larger cluster is reduced in
size by an amount equal to the smaller cluster’s size – if
they are the same size, both clusters are destroyed. Hence
both populations lose the same number of objects which
are then removed, however we stress that our main re-
sults are unchanged if the clusters suffer only finite losses
or receive a limited number of new recruits. The prob-
ability QAB that any A cluster is selected and interacts
with a B cluster is the sum over all s of the probability
for an A cluster of size s to interact with any B clus-
ter, which gives (1 − νA)NA(t)NB(t)/[NA(t) + NB(t)]2.
The probability QBA is a similar expression, with νA
replaced by νB . After an interaction, A and B are
reduced in number by the size of the smallest inter-
acting cluster. The average interaction size c is well
approximated by unity, with a small linear correction
term 0.2NB(0)(1 − νA)(1 − νB)/NA(0). The popula-
tions after i interactions become NA(t) = NA(0) − ic,
NB(t) = NB(0)− ic. Hence the probability for an inter-
action between A and B clusters after i previous inter-
actions is
Q(i) = QAB+QBA (1)
=
(NA(0)− ic)(NB(0)− ic)
(NA(0) +NB(0)− 2ic)2 (2− νA − νB)
To reduce NA(t) and NB(t) by c takes 1/Q(i) timesteps
on average. The total time to reduce one population to
zero is the sum of the timesteps required for each inter-
action, until the population is wiped out. Supposing B
is the smaller population, it will require NB(0)/c interac-
tions to destroy it, hence the final interaction will happen
after NB(0)/c − 1 previous interactions. The total time
to reduce the smaller population B to zero is therefore
T =
NB(0)
c −1∑
i=0
1
Q(i)
(2)
=
NB(0)
c −1∑
i=0
(NA(0) +NB(0)− 2ic)2
(NA(0)− ic)(NB(0)− ic)(2− νA − νB) .
Using the mathematical relationships
∑n
1
1
i = γ+ψ0(n+
1), where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant and ψ0 is
the digamma function, and
∑n
a+1 =
∑n
1 −
∑a
1 , we obtain
the final expression for the conflict’s duration:
T =
NA(0)−NB(0)
c(2− νA − νB)
[ 4NB(0)
NA(0)−NB(0)
+
[
γ + ψ0
(NB(0)
c
+ 1
)]
(3)
−[ψ0(NA(0)
c
+ 1
)
− ψ0
(NA(0)−NB(0)
c
+ 1
)]]
.
If A is the smaller population, the equation has an iden-
tical form but with A and B interchanged.
The red curve in Fig. 1 shows the analytic curve T
from Eq. (3). The peak at x ∼ 0.8 is robust to many
model variants. Its origin can be understood as follows:
When x ∼ 0, clusters of A andB are abundant and have a
reasonably large average size. Encounters between A and
B clusters are frequent and the attrition per encounter is
high, hence T is small. As x increases, with A being the
larger force, an encounter between an A and B cluster is
increasingly likely to wipe out the B cluster completely
since the A cluster is increasingly likely to be the larger
cluster. However the encounter rate is decreasing, and
the overall effect is that T increases. For x → 1, it still
takes a long time to find a B cluster however there are
now very few to find, hence T now decreases. Interest-
ingly, the distribution of inter-event times changes from
3near-exponential away from the peak, to near-power-law
around the peak. Figure 2(a) confirms the accuracy of
our analytic curve as compared to numerical simulations,
the expected symmetry under A ↔ B, and the insensi-
tivity of the main features to the fragmentation and co-
alescence probabilities. We note that if the conflict were
to end after a given fraction of the initial population is
removed, the same qualitative results still emerge since
the theory is essentially invariant under an overall change
of scale. Also, members of A and B need not actually be
destroyed during an encounter – they just have to dis-
appear from the fighting force. Hence the attrition of
NA(t) and NB(t) in Fig. 1 is also interpretable as a loss
of strength or will-power, as opposed to actual casualties.
What if A or B adopt different internal dynamics?
The black curve in Fig. 2(b) reproduces the analytic
result from Fig. 1, while the red-dashed and green
curves explore other scenarios. Remarkably, the duration
T remains essentially unchanged if the majority group
chooses a static internal structure comprising rigid units
of any particular size. Instead, the internal network dy-
namics of the minority group dictate the duration T . If
the minority group loses its dynamical clustering ability
and becomes internally static (i.e. rigid) the duration T
decreases significantly, as seen from the black and red-
dashed curves for small NA(0). If both A and B are
internally static, T is uniformly small for all x.
Empirical validation of Eq. (3) is possible using pub-
lished durations for human conflicts. Indeed, an intrigu-
ing distinction has recently been hypothesized between
old wars in which A and B adopt traditional, fairly rigid,
military structures, and new wars in which B (and possi-
bly A) adopt more fluid tactics akin to our model[19, 20].
Figure 1 demonstrates that our results offer a quantita-
tive validation of this hypothesis. ‘Old’ wars are blue cir-
cles and ‘new’ wars are red triangles, with World War II
labelled by both since it is a natural dividing point. De-
spite the simple generic nature of our model as compared
to the complexity and variety of real-world conflicts, Eq.
(3) captures the trend for all the ‘new’ wars[19, 20], sug-
gesting that our proposed internal network dynamics for
the minority population represents a key common feature
determining their duration. By contrast, the ‘old’ wars
are well described by both the green curve of Fig. 2(b)
(i.e. rigid armies) and the predictions of conventional
mass-action theory (blue curves in Fig. 1)[7, 8], imply-
ing that such internal network dynamics were absent in
‘old’ wars. Additional validation is available in the form
of vocal bird rallies in the wild, since bird calls are very
long-ranged and birds cluster dynamically[4]. If all possi-
ble NA(0) : NB(0) ratios are assumed equally likely over
time, as expected in the wild, the histogram obtained by
integrating our theoretical T vs. x curve over all x will
be bimodal, with peaks at small and large T , which is
precisely the reported empirical form[4].
Figure 3(a) shows that the duration T can be ma-
FIG. 2: (Color online) (a) Solid lines are analytic (Eq. (3))
while the surface is a numerical simulation, as a function of
initial A population NA(0) and fragmentation probability νA
(νB = 0.3). Right-hand branch contains the red curve from
Fig. 1. Initial population NA(0) + NB(0) = 1000. (b) Black
curve: same as Fig. 2(a) with νA = νB = 0.3. Red dashed
curve: A contains rigid units (e.g. size 10) and B is dy-
namically clustering. Green curve: both A and B comprise
rigid units (e.g. size 10). (c) Events. Nodes represent indi-
viduals, or equivalently some indivisible basic fighting unit.
Intra-cluster connections are very strong, while inter-cluster
connections are very weak. Two clusters of same type can
coalesce (e.g. 6 + 4 = 10). Individual clusters can fragment
(e.g. 6 → 6 × 1). Two clusters of opposite type will fight. If
a size 6 cluster fights a size 4 cluster, a single cluster of size
6− 4 = 2 survives.
nipulated significantly by adding a third-party popula-
tion C which can block fights (see Fig. 3(b)). For
simplicity, we assume here that the NC members of C
are permanently arranged into nC groups each with sC
permanent members. Apart from peacekeepers in hu-
man conflict, C could for example be chosen to block
specific self-interaction processes in a damaged immune
system[11, 14]. A and B undergo dynamical clustering
as before, except that if a C group is selected and it
is bigger or equal to the size of the A and B clusters,
the interaction is blocked and the two A and B clusters
are permanently pacified (i.e. neutralized). Figure 3(a)
shows that the duration curves undergo a highly non-
trivial change. If C comprises a only a few, large groups
(e.g. green dotted curve) then T decreases irrespective
of the asymmetry since C clusters will tend to dominate
all encounters. By contrast, if C comprises many small
groups (e.g. red dashed curve) T can be much larger,
showing a huge increase around x ∼ 0 since the C clusters
still get picked for encounters but are not large enough
to neutralize the parties – hence their presence simply
delays the end of the war.
Many generalizations of our model can be made with-
4FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) Black curve as in Figs. 1, 2(a) and
2(b) with A and B undergoing dynamical clustering. νA =
νB = 0.3. Red dashed curve: nC = 100 third-party groups,
each of size sC = 1. Green curve: nC = 1 third-party group,
of size sC = 100. (b) Third-party blocking event. When both
A and B clusters are smaller than the C cluster, the A and
B clusters are neutralized.
out affecting the main findings, e.g. A and B can be
replenished proportionally by a slow birth or recruit-
ment process. In addition to their theoretical interest,
we believe our results may have particular applicability
to immunological battles[11, 13] where dynamical net-
works and clusters with long-ranged non-local interac-
tions are possible[14]. For example, our results may help
shed light on why some latent diseases survive so long
against the immune system, and why small but mobile
populations of metastic cancer cells can be so difficult to
eradicate[12].
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